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VALIDITY OF STOCK-ISSUANCE DEVICE TO PREVENT
TAKEOVER BY CORPORATE OUTSIDERS
Condec Corp. v. Lunkenheimer Co., 230 A.2d 769 (Del. Ch. 1967)
Acquisition of corporate control by outsiders frequently involves a public
offer to purchase shares in the corporation at a stated price (public tender
offer).' When management reasonably and in good faith believes that
acquisition and control by outsiders2 will not be in the best interests of the
corporation, it may take action to prevent takeover. Both the issuance of
new shares of voting stock to those who will vote with management (stock-
issuance device) and the repurchase of corporate stock with company funds
(stock-purchase device) 3 are effective methods of resisting stock purchase
offers made by outsiders. There are, however, objections to their use. Both
devices insulate management against shareholder action.4 Furthermore, it
is difficult to determine whether they are adopted to achieve legitimate
business objectives of the corporation or merely to perpetuate corporate
control.5 Despite the similarity of the two methods, courts have at times
viewed them differently, emphasizing the potential abuse of the stock-issu-
ance device, while admitting the possibility that a properly motivated re-
purchase plan is an appropriate defensive weapon for management. Dela-
ware courts, in recent stock-purchase cases,' have recognized in manage-
ment an expanded discretion in determining corporate policy. An opposite
view of the stock-issuance device was implied in Condec Corp. v. Lunken-
heimer Co.7
1. As a means of acquiring corporate control, the public tender offer has been resorted
to with increasing frequency. In 1960, there were only eight such offers involving corpo-
rations listed on both the American Stock Exchange and the New York Stock Exchange;
in 1965, the number increased to forty-four, twenty-nine involving companies listed on
the New York Exchange and fifteen on the American Exchange. In the first six months
of 1966, thirty-two such offers were reported. Cohen, A Note On Takeover Bids and
Corporate Purchases of Stock, 22 Bus. LAw. 149 (1966); Fleischer & Mundheim,
Corporate Acquisition By Tender Offer, 115 U. PA. L. Rav. 317 (1967).
2. It should be emphasized that there is nothing per se immoral about the use of
the takeover bid, and its advantages have been recently suggested. Manne, Mergers
and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. EcoN. 110 (1965).
3. The stock purchase device usually involves repurchase of the shares from the
outsiders, but may consist of purchases from stockholders who might otherwise sell to
the outsiders.
4. See generally Brudney, Fiduciary Ideology in Transactions Affecting Corporate
Control, 65 MICH. L. Rv. 259 (1966); Fleischer & Mundheim, supra note 1.
5. Brudney, supra note 4, at 271.
6. See note 13 infra.
7. 230 A.2d 769 (Del. Ch. 1967).
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Condec Corporation, after failing to interest the management of Lunken-
heimer Company in a business merger," sought to acquire control of Lunken-
heimer by public tender offer. On February 6, 1967 the first of two public
tender offers was made by Condec and resulted in the acquisition of 21,000
shares of Lunkenheimer common stock. On April 21 Condec made a sec-
ond tender offer seeking an additional 190,000 shares. The avowed pur-
pose of this offer was to give Condec a majority of the 414,000 shares of
Lunkenheimer stock then outstanding. By May 9 a sufficient number of
Lunkenheimer shares had been offered to give Condec an equitable ma-
jority of Lunkenheimer's outstanding common stock. Therefore, by May
10 Condec had received sufficient irrevocable proxies to hold a majority
interest, but, since the transfer of the shares was not complete, actual con-
trol of Lunkenheimer had not been gained.
Meanwhile, the Lunkenheimer directors, believing that control by Condec
was not in the best interests of the company, sought to block the takeover.
To achieve this objective before a sufficient number of shares could actu-
ally be transferred to Condec, Lunkenheimer used the stock-issuance de-
vice-in conjunction with a two-part agreement with United States Indus-
tries, Inc. (USI). On May 9 the Lunkenheimer directors approved the
issuance of 75,000 shares of authorized but unissued common stock. Under
a stock purchase agreement of the same date, the 75,000 shares were to be
transferred to a wholly owned subsidiary of USI (United States Industrial
Corporation (USIC)), for 75,000 shares of USI special preference stock.
The second agreement, entered May 10, provided for transfer to USI of
Lunkenheimer's entire business and assets in return for 416,000 additional
shares of special preference USI stock. To be executed, this agreement
required a majority approval by Lunkenheimer shareholders. If the sale
provided in the second agreement was not consummated, the first agree-
ment, including the 75,000 share issuance, was to be cancelled.
The May 9 issuance of 75,000 shares effectively blocked the attempted
takeover by Condec, since Condec now owned or had an interest in less
than a majority of Lunkenheimer shares. Condec brought an action in
the Delaware Court of Chancery seeking to cancel that issuance alleging
it served no legitimate corporate purpose. The Vice-Chancellor found
that the stock had been issued solely to allow control to pass to USI, rather
than Condec. He ignored management's defense of a good faith belief
that takeover by Condec was not in Lunkenheimer's best interests. The
8. Initially, Condec had proposed a merger to Lunkenheimer; thereafter several
other business proposals were rejected by the Lunkenheimer management which felt
that control by Condec was not in the best interests of the corporation.
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challenged transaction was held to be inherently improper, because it per-
mitted an equitable majority shareholder to have its voice in corporate
affairs reduced by a transaction designed primarily to affect control.9
There is substantial judicial precedent, both in Delaware0 and else-
where,"1 for the proposition relied upon by the Vice-Chancellor that shares
of stock may not be issued for the primary purpose of manipulating cor-
porate control. Where a stock-issuance device, rather than a stock-purchase
device, is challenged, courts seldom reach the issue raised by the Lunken-
heimer management-whether its actions were for the common good or
private advantage. 2 In the stock-purchase cases, on the other hand, the
court does ask why management was concerned about control. 3 Although
the stock-purchase device is mechanically different from the stock-issuance
device--eliminating the outsiders' votes rather than diluting them-the
primary purpose of maintaining corporate control is common to both. The
refusal to examine motive in the stock-issuance cases is questionable con-
sidering the similarity of purpose and effect of the two devices.
The courts have determined the propriety of stock purchases by manage-
ment through application of the "business judgment rule." Under this
standard corporate directors are permitted to eliminate outsider threats to
control, if they can show that the purchases were made in the reasonable
and good faith belief that loss of control would be harmful to the corpo-
ration." '
9. The decision was appealed to the Delaware Supreme Court, but the appeal was
dismissed as moot, when, pending appeal, USI withdrew its offer to purchase Lunken-
heimer's assets, thereby cancelling the Lunkenheimer-USIC stock exchange.
10. Canada Southern Oils, Ltd. v. Manabi Exploration Co., 33 Del. Ch. 537, 96
A.2d 810 (Ch. 1953); Yasik v. Wachtel, 25 Del. Ch. 247, 17 A.2d 309 (Ch. 1941);
Bowen v. Imperial Theatres, Inc., 13 Del. Ch. 120, 115 A. 918 (Ch. 1922); Kingston
v. Home Life Ins. Co. of America, 11 Del. Ch. 258, 101 A. 898 (Ch. 1917).
11. Schwab v. Schwab-Wilson Mach. Corp., 13 Cal. App. 2d 1, 55 P.2d 1268
(1936); Trask v. Chase, 107 Me. 137, 77 A. 698 (1910); Andersen v. Albert & J.M.
Anderson Mfg. Co., 325 Mass. 343, 90 N.E.2d 541 (1950); Elliott v. Baker, 194
Mass. 518, 80 N.E. 450 (1907); Luther v. C.J. Luther Co., 118 Wis. 112, 94 N.W. 69
(1903). But see McPhail v. L.S. Starrett Co., 257 F.2d 388 (1st Cir. 1958).
12. See Yasik v. Wachtel, 25 Del. Ch. 247, 256, 17 A.2d 309, 313 (Ch. 1941). The
court stated that issuance of shares by directors solely to perpetuate or obtain voting
control constitutes a breach of the fiduciary duty owed shareholders.
13. Cheff v. Mathes, 41 Del. Ch. 494, 199 A.2d 548 (Sup. Ct. 1964); Bennett
v. Propp, 41 Del. Ch. 14, 187 A.2d 405 (Sup. Ct. 1962); Martin v. American Potash
& Chem. Corp., 33 Del. Ch. 234, 92 A.2d 295 (Sup. Ct. 1952); Kors v. Carey, 39
Del. Ch. 47, 158 A.2d 136 (Ch. 1960).
14. Israels, Corporate Purchase of Its Own Shares-Are There New Overtones?,
50 CORN. L.Q. 620, 624 (1965).
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While case law reveals precedent for the rejection of the business judg-
rment rule in stock-issuance cases,"5 dicta in one stock-purchase case sug-
gests that if management can prove that the stock was issued in the reason-
able belief that corporate welfare was threatened by the outsiders, the
transaction should be sustained. The court in Kors v. Carey", asserted that
since the directors are fiduciaries of the shareholders, they may in the "ex-
ercise of their honest business judgment' 7 take valid steps to eliminate
a threat to the well-being of the corporation," a principle equally applica-
ble to the stock-issuance cases.
There is justification, on the other hand, for the proposition that di-
rectors should not determine whether retention of control is in the best in-
terests of the corporation. It is undesirable to permit elected management
the choice of whether or not to retain office. 9 However, assuming the va-
lidity of the business judgment rule in stock-purchase cases, the same ra-
tionale would warrant application of a good faith defense in the stock-
issuance cases. Management should have some means of blocking takeover
by outsiders when it is clearly not in the best interests of the corporation.
For example, in the principal case management presented evidence that
Condec had over-extended itself financially and was too dependent on fluc-
tuating defense contracts."0 And in a stock-purchase case management
successfully argued that the corporation's method of marketing its product
would be harmfully altered by outsider takeover.2 ' Although directors
faced with a public tender offer can inform shareholders that sale of their
stock is not sound policy, such a procedure is not likely to be effective
against a tender offer at premium rates. When directors are motivated
by defensible views regarding the best interests of the corporation, the
business judgment rule should be applied in the stock-issuance cases.22
15. See Elliott v. Baker, 194 Mass. 518, 522-23, 80 N.E. 450, 452 (1907); Luther v.
C.J. Luther Co., 118 Wis. 112, 124, 94 N.W. 69, 73 (1903).
16. 39 Del. Oh. 47, 158 A.2d 136 (Ch. 1960).
17. Id. at 55-56, 158 A.2d at 141.
18. This general proposition set out in the Kors case would appear to embrace the
3ituation in Condec. The Condec court, however, rejected this dicta and determined
that unlike the situation in the stock-purchase cases, the challenged transaction was em-
ployed to manipulate control and, therefore, the motivation of the directors was not
considered. Condec Corp. v. Lunkenheimer Co., 230 A.2d 769, 777 (Del. Ch. 1967).
19. See Comment, Buying Out Insurgent Shareholders with Corporate Funds, 70
YALE L.J. 308, 316 (1960).
20. Condec Corp. v. Lunkenheimer Co., 230 A.2d 769, 771 (Del. Oh. 1967).
21. Oheff v. Mathes, 41 Del. Ch. 494, 199 A.2d 548 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
22. In considering the applicability of the business judgment rule to stock-issuance
cases, the courts appear to differentiate close and publicly held corporations. In the
case of the publicly held corporation, the court is likely to consider motives of cor-
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From the shareholders' point of view there is little difference between
the stock-issuance and stock-purchase cases. Both control devices dilute
shareholder voting power and thus enable management to deprive share-
holders of a choice between conflicting policies. In the stock-purchase sit-
uation this dilution of shareholder voting power is caused (1) by elimi-
nating alternative directors and policies from which the shareholders might
choose, and (2) by eliminating a shareholder with a sufficiently large block
of shares to effectively challenge the incumbents. Shareholder interests are
similarly shackled by the stock-issue device because directors are permitted
at their own discretion to increase the number of votes necessary to remove
them from office. Action by directors which restricts the shareholders' con-
tractual or statutory right to determine who shall manage corporate affairs
should be permitted only if management can demonstrate that they were
motivated solely by the well-being of the corporation. This question can
be tested in either an issuance or repurchase situation by application of
the business judgment rule.
The Condec situation would seem an attractive one for judicial restraint,
because Lunkenheimer's shareholders were in fact provided an opportunity
to choose between control by Condec or USI. In order to consummate
the stock-issuance agreement, the Lunkenheimer stockholders had first to
approve the sale agreement with USI. Assuming arguendo that the Lunk-
enheimer directors were acting for personal benefit, the shareholders theo-
retically could protect themselves by rejecting the sale to USI.23 The exist-
ence of this opportunity to choose between alternative policies could have
been used to justify a different result in Condec.
Clearly the stock-issuance device cannot be used to diminish a majority
shareholder's right to his proportionate voice in corporate affairs. The
Condec decision is a valid application of this principle. However, Condec
should not foreclose application of the business judgment rule in all cases
challenging use of the stock-issuance device. The court's determination in
both the stock-purchase and stock-issuance cases should ultimately turn
on when and why the particular device is being employed, rather than
porate well-being as justification for a stock issuance. However, the cases involving a
close corporation emphasize the interest of the acquiring shareholder and rarely con-
sider the motives of management. See Brudney, supra note 4, at 266-67.
23. While such a rejection required a majority vote, in light of the fact that USI
controlled 75,000 newly-issued shares, and would, of course, vote in favor of the pro-
posed sale, the actual percentage of votes needed to defeat the transaction would have
been approximately sixty percent of the outstanding shares prior to the issuance. Fur-
thermore, it is possible that Lunkenheimer issued enough shares to USI to assure that
USI and the incumbent directors would have sufficient votes to approve the sale of
assets, thereby effectively eliminating the alternative of shareholder rejection.
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merely on whether it is used to manipulate control. In cases like Condec,
when the stock-issuance device is used after the outsiders have gained an
equitable majority, the business judgment rule should not be available as a
defense. However, if management employs the stock-issuance device before
the outsiders have acquired a majority interest, the business judgment test
is a proper standard for examining the action of management. In cases
where the business judgment rule is a permissible standard, management
should bear the burden of justifying its action, since it is best able to ex-
plain its purposes." The emphasis in these cases would be shifted from
protection of shareholders seeking to acquire control to protection of all
interested shareholders. By examining motive, the business judgment rule
can afford an effective safeguard against possible abuses by directors seek-
ing to enhance their own power by means of the stock-issuance device.
24. Placing the burden of proof on management recognizes the current trend of
limiting management discretion in conflict of interest situations. Brudney, supra note 4;
Fleischer & Mundheim, supra note 1; Israels, supra note 14; Comment, 62 COLUM. L.
Rav. 1096 (1962); Comment, 50 CORN. L.Q. 302 (1965); Comment, 1965 Duxn L.J.
412; Comment, 78 HARv. L. REv. 1253 (1965); Comment, supra note 19.
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